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Executive Summary
This report was written as a survey of web spam filtering methods that might be incorporated into 
the  BlogForever  blog archiving software as  a  component  designed to remove  material  deemed 
unsuitable  for  inclusion  into  a  blog  archive.  Spam  comprises  a  significant  proportion  of  the 
information on the web. For, example, the Spam Clock1 claims that there are one million new spam 
pages created every hour. Given that 300 million websites were estimated to have been added in 
20112, this is an impressive number should it be true. In the case of spam that arrive at weblogs,  
over 80% of  comments submitted to blog spam filtering services (such as Akismet3) for assessment 
have been classified as spam. 
The large volumes of spam form a formidable body of noise for a web archive targeting specified  
content,  and, further,  poses technical  difficulties for the web spider in charge of discriminating 
between  material  relevant  to  the  archive  and  that  which  is  not.  The  discussion  in  this  report  
highlights a range of approaches that have been used in different circumstances to detect spam on 
the web. In particular, we focus on those methods concerned with isolating blog related spam.    
The promising features of different approaches have been aggregated in a multi-layered workflow 
as a proposal for the architecture for the BlogForver spam detection strategy. The first of this layer  
(Section 6.2.1) relies on matching strategies using the Unique Resource Locator (URL) and Internet 
Protocol  (IP)  address,  blog  identification,  and  on  applying  a  range  of  ready-made  anti-spam 
application platform interfaces (APIs). The second of these layers (Section 6.2.2) adopts a statistical  
machine  learning strategy based on  base  classifiers  built  on simple  content,  link  and temporal  
features.  A third layer  using implicit  relevance feedback (Section 6.3.3) from end-user  activity 
(number of visitations, downloads, clicks and queries) and reported spam (Section 6.3.2) to improve 
search ranking algorithms and feed suspected URLs and content back to the first two layers is also  
mentioned.  It  is  also emphasised here  that,  ideally,  it  is  recommended  that  the  three layers  of 
detection should be preceded by a directed spidering strategy (Section 6.3.1) designed to harvest a  
reduced  number  of  blogs  deemed  truly  relevant  to  the  repository  objectives  which  would 
immediately reduce the demand on the URL management capacity of the weblog spider and spam 
detector.  
The work in this report was carried out to meet the practical demands of the BlogForever archive 
software for a spam removal strategy. However, some of the discussions in this report will show 
that spam is actually a valuable cultural artefact that tells a story about  how human information 
technology  and  space  has  developed  into  what  it  is  now.  In  fact,  recently  there  have  been 
discussions about spam culture and how attitudes towards different forms of spam differ according 
to the country in which you reside4. We build technology to avoid spam (if only by creating tools to 
find “truly relevant information”) and spam is created to outsmart these technologies. In effect,  
socially,  historically,  and technologically spam is a cultural  heritage of our time.  As such it  is 
unclear whether we should be removing this part of our history for the immediate convenience of 
what we think is valuable with respect to our own cultural standards.
The introduction (Chapter 1) discusses the history and value of spam a bit further, followed by a 
discussion of web spam and blog spam types (Chapter 2). The overview of ready-made anti-spam 
APIs  are  presented  in  Chapter  3  and other  methods  recommended  for  the  prevention  of  spam 
entering into blogs are mentioned in Chapter 4. A description of the research landscape in the area  
1 A application created by blekko.com reportedly tracking spam. http://www.spamclock.com
2 http://royal.pingdom.com/2012/01/17/internet-2011-in-numbers/  
3 http://www.akismet.com  
4 http://blogs.computerworld.com/14830/spam_culture_part_1_china  
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of spam filtering is given in the next chapter (Chapter 5). The proposed spam detection strategy for 
BlogForever is presented in Chapter 6. The document concludes with a summary of the findings 
and few additional observations in Chapter 7. Where appropriate, we have also included in the 
Appendix, usage examples of the suggested anti-spam APIs (Appendix A) and statistical packages 
related to machine learning approaches that might serve as a reference in adaptive methodologies 
(Appendix B).    
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1 Introduction
Current archiving standards often place some emphasis on selection and appraisal, that is, selecting  
material to be included in the archive and “evaluating records to determine which are to be retained 
as archives, which are to be kept for specified periods and which are to be destroyed” 5.  Those 
archiving  information  from  the  web  (e.g.  the  LiWA  project6)  have  also  become  increasingly 
interested in selective archiving practices. This has led to proposals for web archiving practices that  
incorporate  methods that might be able to detect and remove noise. One such perceived noise that  
has been singled out in the web archiving context is spam.  
Although  the  association  between  spam  and  electronic  communication  has  now  become 
inseparable,  spam,  as  “unsolicited bulk  messages  sent  out  indiscriminately”,  already existed in 
18647 when a dentist used the telegram as a medium of advertisement to promote his new practice. 
In  fact,  unsolicited  mail,  advertising  products,  appealing  for  charities,  promoting  causes, 
campaigning  for  candidates,  and,  leading  the  reader  away  from  the  truth,  arrive  at  our  door  
everyday. The electronic communication systems that now allow users to generate and disseminate 
content  easily  (e.g.  through  email,  websites,  wikis,  blogs,  and  social  networks)  have  merely  
facilitated the invasion of unsolicited messages, irrelevant search engine results, and misleading 
data and/or information, into our information space, on a much larger scale. 
Before the heavy use of web search engines, spam was considered to be mostly related to email  
messages. email spam is still a prolific form of spam: Message Labs monthly report, in May 2011,  
estimated  75.8%  of  emails  globally  to  be  spam8.  However,  the  predominance  of  unsolicited, 
irrelevant content is now as visible within general web content as it is in email. For example, two of  
the leading anti-spam services for blogs, Akismet9 and Mollom10, report that, respectively, 83% and 
90% of blog comments examined by them were predicted to be spam. In fact, in the context of web 
search, spam has come to mean more than unsolicited, irrelevant content to attract user responses.  
Gyöngyi  & Garcia-Molina (2005) define web spam as comprising “any deliberate human action 
that is meant to improve a site’s ranking without changing the site’s true value”. Whereas, on email,  
the aim is to fool and elicit a response from the recipients themselves, on the web, the intention,  
often,  extends  further  to  fooling  the  search  engine  to  raise  the  rank  of  target  pages  (a.k.a.  
spamdexing11) and increase the number of visits. 
This is done for a variety of reasons,  for example,  to promote pages that cause malware to be 
installed on your local computer when it is visited, to market products, services and affiliated pages,  
and to increase their revenue from advertisers that finance the site (e.g. see discussion in Egele et al.  
2011). This leads to further polluted information generated by automated queries (submitted as part 
of the process to plagiarise highly ranked content), misleading tags (to promote or demote a page),  
click-frauds  (to  cause  financial  damage  to  advertisers  without  corresponding  profit)  and 
undeserving product reviews motivated by self interest (see discussions in Heymann 2007; Duskin  
& Feitelson 2009; Haddadi 2010; Catillo & Davison 2011).
It has been estimated by Kolari (2007) that 75% of pings received at ping servers are spings (that is, 
pings sent out by non-blogs or spam blogs created for the purpose of promoting affiliated websites). 
The same study predicts approximately 88% or more of the URLS received at the ping server to be 
5 Ellis, J. (1993) (ed.). "Keeping Archives" 2nd edn (Melbourne: Australian Society of Archivists) p.461.
6 http://www.liwa-project.eu/  
7 http://www.economist.com/node/10286400/  
8 http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlireport/MLI_2011_05_May_FINAL-en.pdf  
9 http://akismet.com/  
10 http://mollom.com/  
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spamdexing   
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non-blogs or spam blogs. Further, approximately 20-25% of blog search engine (e.g. Technorati 12) 
results have been estimated to be spam blogs. The prevalence of spam has led Google to take action 
by  offering  the  option  to  webpage  managers  (for  example,  blog  owners  and  blog  software 
providers) for including a “nofollow” attribute with respect to selected content, that Google will  
honour in calculating the page rank, to discourage spammers from submitting spam (e.g. see Marks 
& Celik 2011). 
 
There have been several recent surveys on web spam which are listed in Figure1.1. The survey by 
Castillo  &  Davis  (2011)  on  adversarial  web  search  is  the  most  comprehensive,  covering  an 
extensive array of topics related to web spam in general, while the surveys by Mishne (2007) and 
Kolari (2007) mostly limit their discussion to comment spam and spam blogs, respectively. To gain  
a fuller picture of the research area, this report should be considered in conjunction with these other 
surveys.  
Note that, while the above discussion clearly demonstrates that spam is a formidable obstacle in 
everyday search and exploration of information, from a web archival perspective, it is not clear that 
this  should lead to the conclusion that we must  remove the spam from archival holdings.  This  
would depend on the archival objectives. For example, from a forensics or record keeping point of  
view, spam could hold the key to vital evidence in a criminal investigation (for example, some use 
12 http://technorati.com/   
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spam to conduct fraudulent activity).  Likewise, from a cultural and social studies point of view,  
spam  is  an  essential  part  of  our  culture13.  The  examination  of  spam  could  provide  clues  to 
understanding  their  long  term  effects,  on  technological  development  and  how  we  relate  to 
information,  because  spamming  techniques  are  developed  to  undermine  search  algorithms  and 
search algorithms are, in turn, developed to avoid spam (this is why Castillo and Davison (2011) 
use the term “adversarial search”14). The history of changes in spam is the story of our technological 
achievements. Another more immediate reason to retain spam is the undeniable reality that they are 
the very examples and evidences of our failure to provide automated approaches to effective search 
systems that find “truly relevant information”. They provide feedback to support the improvement  
of our information systems.
Regardless of the policies regarding their retention, their detection is undoubtedly valuable within 
the contexts mentioned above. As such, an efficient method for the detection of spam is likely to be 
an invaluable addition to a web archive. We propose to investigate here the spam detection methods 
available and implementable as part of the BlogForever weblog archive. The proposal made here is 
based on the following principles:
• consistent quality of service within the archive
• simplicity with respect to implementation
• adaptability of the method to new spam and technology 
• compatibility with constraints within the repository
By  consistent quality of service,  it is intended that the spam detection method proposed here is 
designed with an effort to avoid sudden fluctuations of performance in the future. As such, if third 
party tools and APIs (details of which are closed to the archive) are employed there should be, in  
conjunction, a backup plan for the sudden unavailability of these tools or if further development of 
these tool become inactive.  Simplicity not only lowers the effort of the repository with respect to 
implementation,  maintenance  and  adaptation,  but  also  reduces  processing  time,  taking  into  
consideration scalability (as the archive grows), and minimises  the probability of crossing end-
user’s tolerance level, should any steps be carried out in real time. The method’s ability to adapt to  
emerging  spamming  techniques is  also  essential:  spam  is  designed  to  undermine  ongoing 
developments in search technology, and, to sustain the archive’s ability to deliver relevant content, 
any spam detection mechanisms should ideally maintain the initial performance level. All of this 
might still need to be governed by practical constraints imposed by the resources available (both 
technical  and  human)  within  the  repository,  and  compatibility  with  other  best  practice 
recommendations of the archive.
In line with the BlogForever project Description of Work, we have focused on identifying anti-
spam methods that might constitute an efficient approach to the detection of three types of spam 
specific to blogs15: 
• splogs, i.e. blogs that exist to promote affiliated websites, by influencing users to visit a  
webpage or buy a product, as well as spamdexing to undeservedly improve the ranking of a  
page in a web search by plagiarising content, stuffing keywords or creating large number of  
links,
• blog comments that contain abusive content or are irrelevant to the original post, and,
• fraudulent pings from non-blogs and/or splogs to attract visitors by misrepresenting content 
as fresh. 
13 http://blogs.computerworld.com/14830/spam_culture_part_1_china  
14 A term borrowed from Game Theory:
     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk%3ACombinatorial_game_theory#Adversarial_search   
15 As outlined in Part B of the BlogForever Description of Work, Work Package 2 Deliverable 2.5 details.
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In the next sections these spam types have been put into the context of general web spam (Chapter 
2). This will be followed by a review of ready-made weblog anti-spam services for blogs that are  
already available (Chapter 3). For a complete discussion, a summary of methods for preventing  the 
introduction  of  spam into  blogs,  recommended  by  blog  service  providers,  have  been  included 
(Chapter 4). However, most of these methods involve direct interaction with users of the blog, a  
communication channel not usually available at the archive. Current research in web spam detection 
is presented in Chapter 5. This overview is weighted by an emphasis on those related to blogs. In 
Chapter 6, the discussion is reflected in a proposal for a weblog spam detection strategy that might  
be  reasonably  incorporated  into  the  BlogForever  archive  framework.  The  feasibility  of  its 
implementation, however, still needs to be tested within the course of Work Package 4. In Chapter 
7, we summarise our findings and make some final observations. We have also tried to include  
examples of codes in the appendix, where appropriate, for illustrative purposes.
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2 Web spam Types
Email spam is intended to elicit a direct response from the recipients themselves (e.g. leading them 
to buy products, click on links, pass out information). While this is not outside the scope of web  
spam objectives, web spam is often also constructed with the aim to fool the web search engines 
(e.g. so that the search engine will rank the target pages higher in the returned list, rank other pages  
lower in the list, create misleading associations, and lead to undeserving costs and profits).  This  
could be put into effect by generating links (e.g. link farms) that affect link-based ranking scores 
(e.g.  Google’s  PageRank16),  manipulating  content  (e.g.  embedding  spam  in  pages  containing 
plagiarised content form highly ranked pages), cloaking parts of the page to supply independent  
content depending on the type of client requesting the page (e.g. whether it is a crawler or browser 
request), automated generation of user logs and data (e.g. a large  number of the same site address  
in logs lead to a misrepresentation of site popularity,  increased site visits, and raises the rank of the  
website),  and using pings to mask content as being fresh and attract visitors.  The taxonomy of  
different types of spam is summarised in Figure 2.1.
16 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PageRank
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In the context of blogs, content spam is largely dominated by comment spam, where spammers take 
advantage of the  commenting  system to market  products,  post  links,  and propagate misleading 
information. 
In addition to comment spam, however, spam can take the form of splogs. These are websites that 
exist to promote affiliated sites by increasing user visits to the target site and raise the rank of target 
sites with respect to web services such as search engines. While splogs can also contain comment  
spam, these blogs are more frequently used to create link farms, a large number nepotistic links to  
manipulate search algorithms that associate importance of a website with its in-links, raising the  
rank of target websites. There are many splogs that use ping servers to simulate fresh content to 
attract  visitors,  sometimes  even  initiating  the  installation  of  malware  (e.g.  spyware)  when  it  
successfully attracts a visitor. Splogs are different from other web spam (Lin et al. 2008)  regarding 
two main aspects:
1. Blogs are highly volatile and unlike the regular web where the content is relatively static, a 
blog continuously generates fresh content.
2. Hyperlinks are often interpreted as an endorsement of other pages. It is less likely that a  
web  spam gets  endorsements  from normal  sites.  However,  since  spammers  can  create 
hyperlinks using comment links or trackbacks in normal blogs, all links cannot be treated as 
endorsements.
Because of these two significant  differences,  the splog problem is vastly different from that of  
traditional web spam.
There are other forms of spamming that are polluting voting system (e.g. the “like” button) statistics  
and automatically generated user data (e.g. automated generation of tags to obfuscate algorithms 
that use tags to improve relevance judgements). There is extensive research in all of these areas 
(e.g. see [9]): spamming techniques tend to employ automatic generation of blogs, comments, and 
user data, the statistical behaviour patterns of automatically generated information has been shown 
to  be  different  from that  of  user  generated  information.  For  example,  genuine  usage  data  and 
automatically generated usage data exhibit distinct statistical patterns ([9]). The taxonomy of blog 
spam discussed in this report is summarised in Figure 2.2.
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2.1 Content spam
There have been no shortage of proposals for web content spam detection: for example, people have 
suggested using topic detection (e.g. Blei et al. 2003; Bìrò 2009), host classification (Fetterly et al. 
2004),  cloaking  detection  (Chellapila  & Chickering  2006),  user  query statistics  (Ntoulas  et  al. 
2006), syntactic models such as part-of-speech n-grams (Piskorski et al. 2008), term distance model  
(Attenberg & Suel 2008), and language model comparison (Mishne 2005) [see Figure 2.3].
There  are  characterisations  of  comment  spam  in  terms  of  their  content,  e.g.  comment-post  
similarity,  frequency of nouns, redundancy of words, anchor text frequency and stop word ratio  
(Bhattarai,  Rus,  Dasgupta  200917),  which  have  been  used  to  propose  supervised  and  semi-
supervised classification engines. The difficulty of spam is that as soon as an approach to eradicate  
spam is devised, better spamming techniques will be developed in parallel.
Nevertheless most  of the identified features have been incorporated into spam filtering methods 
and/or  services  (e.g.  Akismet18,  Mollom19,  Defensio20,  and  TypePad  Anti-Spam21).  While  the 
inference engines are sometimes published, the rules that are used are often hidden to prevent the  
emergence of new spamming techniques that target these rules. However, the services are often 
available for private use as an API that detects spam on the basis of submitted content.
The detection methods developed often work at different stages of the repository workflow: e.g.  
submission,  indexing,  and ranking (more  detail  in  Chapter  5).  While  ready made  solutions  are  
convenient, they are generally limited to content spam (i.e. does not address splogs and spings – see 
Chapter 3).  They are also only externally adaptable,  i.e.  the repository has no control  over the 
17 http://issrl.cs.memphis.edu/files/papers/blog-spam_IEEE-SSCI-09.pdf  
18 http://akismet.com/  
19 http://mollom.com/  
20 http://www.defensio.com/  
21 http://antispam.typepad.com/  
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source,  and,  therefore,  cannot  easily change it  internally to  incorporate  new methods  for  spam 
detection that become available). 
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2.2 Spam blogs (Splogs)
In Section 2.1, we visited the area of content spam. In this section we turn our attention to Spam 
blogs, a. k. a. Splogs, that are created solely for the purpose of promoting affiliated sites. Lin et al  
(2008) observed temporal behaviour that distinguish such splogs, e.g. they noted that links in splogs 
vary little over time, they are characterised by very narrow or very broad topics with respect to their 
content, and they tend to be updated regularly at very precise times. Sato et al. (2008) also noticed 
temporal features such as life span of keyword in splogs which was found to be very long lived or 
very short lived.
Urvoy et al. (2008) found that web pages could be grouped according to stylistic similarity based on  
HTML  templates,  which,  in  turn,  can  be  used  to  infer  whether  or  not  a  page  is  a  spam by 
association. Some have also tried to detect nepotistic links by measuring the similarity between 
source and target document (Davison 2000; Benczúr et al. 2006; Qi et al. 2007; Martinez-Romo & 
Araujo 2009). This is comparable to Mishne 2007 who compared the language model of post to that  
of comment to detect comment spam.
Kolari (2007) developed a meta-ping system to tag triples (name, url, time-stamp) with a score of 
legitimacy. He presented a comparative study of several previously identified features for spam 
filtering (e.g. word grams, ratios).  However, his contribution to spam filtering was in proposing a 
multilevel approach to be applied to several stages (e.g. before fetching the page and after fetching 
the page), and proposing the use of ensemble base learners to implement an adaptive spam filtering 
technique in an adversarial search context.
 
An overview of the research landscape described above is captured as a mindmap in Figure 2.4. 
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3 Ready-made anti-spam tools
Currently, there are several widely adopted spam fighting services. Best known anti-spam services 






TypePad Anti-Spam (TAPAS, http://antispam.typepad.com/)
The  first  two,  while  it  is  still  widely  used  within  many  circles,  have  now  ceased  further 
development. Here, we will consider the four latter applications more carefully. There isn’t much 
information  regarding  the  inner  workings  of  any  of  these  applications,  with  good  reason,  as 
spammers  would take advantage of  the  information to  try to  get  through.  TypePad  Anti-Spam 
(TAPAS) is the only one of these four that provides open access to their inference engine (rules are  
kept hidden). While some of these remove suspect comments even before moderation by the blog 
owner (e.g. Mollom), others offer the owner the opportunity to provide feedback, exposing false 
positives to the user.   In the case of Defensio, the user is also provided with a  spaminess  (the 
estimated likelihood that a message is spam) score, which could be informative.
Key characteristics of these tools are summarised in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Comparison of Anti-Spam Plugin Software
Akismet Defensio Mollom TAPAS
Company Automatic Websense Mollom Six Apart
When  in  doubt 
challenge  with 
CAPTCHA?
No No Yes No
Own API? Yes Yes Yes Uses Akismet API
Open source engine? No No No Yes
Free for personal use? Yes Yes Yes  (limited 
volume  and 
features)
Yes
Free  for  commercial 
use?
No  ($5/month 
for  problogger 
earning  more 
than 
$500/month; 
$50/month  for 
enterprise)
Yes  (limited 
traffic)
Yes  (limited 
volume  and 
features)
Yes
The APIs discussed here along with a few other APIs and libraries are proposed as a first stage  
spam detection step within the  BlogForever  spam detection strategy (see discussion in  Section 
6.2.1). There are some concerns in relying solely on these APIs. We will discuss these concerns 
further at the beginning of Chapter 6 which describes the recommended spam detection strategy. 
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In addition to the above services, SplogSpot (http://splogspot.com/) provides a splog search engine, 
which may, unlike these other services, be able to go beyond comment spam, and help determine 
site level legitimacy. SplogSpot provides an API that allows access to the database of splogs. 
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4 Preventive methods for filtering spam
Even before  the  new comments  or  blogs  are  accepted  into  the  blogosphere  several  preventive 
mechanisms can be put into place to discourage their publication. Among these are: 
• Turing test
• Throttling user actions (allow limited number or time period for comment submission)
• Regulating comments to old posts
• Software update
• Authentication
• Obfuscating comment script
• Add new required fields for comments
• Use of spam word and black/grey/white list databases
The assumption that motivates the use of Turing tests (e.g. Captcha22 and ReCaptcha23) is the notion 
that spam is mostly created automatically, i.e. not by a human being. The same notion motivates  
throttling repeated actions (e.g. putting a limit on absolute number of action and rate of repeated  
actions), discontinuing comments to old posts (i.e. limited time for actions), updating the blog or 
commenting  system  software  so  that  automated  scripts  are  forced  to  deal  with  changing 
circumstances  and  different  security  protocols,  and,  authenticating  login,  obfuscating  comment  
script, and having a variable set of required fields for submitted comments.
These methods, while somewhat successful in reducing the number of spam, have been criticised  
for  discouraging  users  with  legitimate  posts.  Captchas  have  been  criticised  for  discouraging 
interaction from the visually and/or aurally impaired persons. Likewise other forms of preventive 
methods (e.g. authentication) require users to share information, which many are reluctant to do.  
Adding required fields  also discourages  communication by increasing the labour  of  submitting 
information. 
A more immediate concern, however, is whether these approaches are applicable within the context 
of a crawler of an archive outside of the context of real-time blogging.  For example, at the stage of  
crawling the post and/or blog the archive may not have access to the user to ask them to complete a  
Turing test, and even if such information were to be available, it is unclear that it is appropriate for 
the archive to ask the user for information, since there was no explicit request from that user that the 
information they submitted be included in an archive. Throttling,  regulating, and authenticating 
actions are also primarily options available for blog owners implement as a process at the time of 
submission.  Software  update,  obfuscating  scripts,  as  well  as,  adding  required  fields  are  only 
applicable  within  the  context  of  the  blog  platform  through  which  the  user  submitted  the 
information. 
The only reasonable preventive methods from the list above is the use of databases compiling spam 
words, and black/grey/white lists of IP addresses and URLs. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the use of  
such database carries some preservation, sustainability and adaptability risks, especially when the 
list is managed by a third party. Note that black lists refer to identified splogs, white lists refer to 
legitimate blogs, while grey lists refer to temporarily rejected posts/blogs set aside for verification.
In Chapter 5 we will introduce some more sophisticated filtering methods that have been employed  
at the time of crawling for blogs (Section 5.1). These can be considered preventive methods as well,  
while being more likely to be applicable to a blog archive crawler. 
22 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAPTCHA  
23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ReCAPTCHA  
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5 Spam detection approaches
Spam detection approaches can be examined from several perspectives. On one hand, there are 
approaches that are tailored to handle specific spam types (Chapter 2). On the other hand, spam 
detection can be categorised by the timing of that  the  detection takes place,  or  by the type  of  
features that the detection algorithm incorporates.
In this section we look at the latter two perspectives. In particular, we give a brief summary of  
methods that might be employed at the time of crawling (Section 5.1.1), at the time of indexing 
(Section 5.1.2), and the time of ranking the results of searching a collection (Section 5.1.3).  Then,  
in  Section  5.2,  we  will  discuss  different  types  of  features,  divided  into  spatial  (i.e.  features  
associated with the webpages at a fixed point in time) and temporal properties (i.e. changes that  
occur  over  time).  The  spatial  features  are  further  broken  down  in  terms  of  the  cost  of  their  
extraction  (i.e.  how  much  of  the  content  has  to  be  extracted  and  processed  to  obtain  the  
information).
In this section, we also address the question of adaptability, as spam detection that is effective only 
now incurs additional cost in the long term, while an evolving and/or adaptive framework would 
reduce the cost  in the long term.  We feel  that  it  is  mandatory for the prototype spam filtering 
approach within an archival context to be adaptive to new spamming techniques. This is crucial for 
efficient and effective managing, quality maintenance, and preservation of the web archive material.
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5.1 Stages of detection
5.1.1 At the time of crawling
The earlier stages of the framework described by Kolari (2007) (Section 2.2) are spam detection 
method using features available at the time of crawling and harvesting pages. There is no serious 
indexing of the content used at this point. Features used will tend to be local features found with the 
target blog. While ready made anti-spam APIs (Chapter 3) can be used at the time of crawling, the 
methods  they employ could be based on information they have obtained from indexed content  
stored elsewhere.
Ma et al. (2009) have proposed further filtering methods based on an analysis of IP addresses, and 
geographic information, and Webb et al.  (2008) have used information found within the HTTP 
response, e.g. IP address to website ratio and identification of software being used, to single out 
suspect sources. While the question of quality is distinct from spamicity (likelihood that a message 
is spam – similar to spaminess discussed in Chapter 3), Castillo (2004) observes that prioritising 
high quality sites can be helpful. Some have also remarked that the avoidance of crawler traps can 
aid spam filtering [Lee et al. (2009)].
Within the context of email spam, P2P collaborative filtering has also been suggested24, however, 
the extent of this sort of implementation and their effectiveness within the community of weblog 
providers and users is unclear. A more common method of  filtering would be a direct use of a IP  
blacklist such as that found at Blog Spam Blacklist (http://blogspambl.com/) or databases of spam 
pages such as that available at SplogSpot (http://splogspot.com/). A continuous survey of other lists 
of this kind would be desirable to update the database on a regular basis. 
Other methods may include identifying URL patterns (e.g. see Section 5.2.1).  The mindmap in 
Firgure 5.1 summarises  the main methods.
24 http://dspam.nuclearelephant.com/
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In  addition  to  the  above,  Graham (2002,  2003)  suggests  a  simple  Bayesian  method  for  spam 
filtering based on estimating the probability that a message containing a selected single word is 
spam. Although his method does require some training data (in this sense, it could be considered to 
be a detection method applicable only at the time of indexing – see Section 5.1.2) it may be handled  
incrementally with only a small seed set obtained from elsewhere. The strategy was described in the 
context of email spam but has potential to be modified for blog posts.  One of his observations 
relevant  to  web  spam is  that  vocabulary  of  a  message  should  include  all  header  information  
including formatting tags as they contribute to spam identification.  
5.1.2 At the time of indexing
Detection of spam at the time of indexing is the most prolific approach to spam detection. While it  
is more expensive than detection methods that  might  be employed at  the time of crawling,  the  
amount of information that becomes available upon accessing and comparing home pages makes 
the detection more robust and effective. We have grouped features that have been indexed for spam 
detection into four groups: content based features (e.g. language models, words, popular queries,  
redundancy,  style,  anchor  text,  structural  elements  such  as  titles  and  headings,  and  URL 
characteristics),  usage  data  based  features  (e.g.  number  of  visits,  query  history,  and  browsing 
history),  link based features (e.g. number  of out-links and in-links, neighbourhood size,  linking 
pattern, graph structure, and degrees),  and temporal features (e.g. change over time and rate of  
growth). The mindmap in Figure 5.2 summarises these key features. 
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Ntoulas et al. (2006) concentrated on content based features, noting the percentage of redundant 
content and average word lengths distinguishing features of spam, and the fact that popular queries  
appear frequently in spam. Other indicative features draw on anchor text characteristics and words 
in the title and headings as well and URL. Mishne et al. (2005) used statistical language modelling 
to compare the probability of both post and comment to be from the same language model, to weed 
out  comment  spam.  Urvoy (2008)  demonstrated some success  in  clustering pages  according to 
HTML based stylistic similarity thereby propagating the spamicity of a seed authoritative set of 
pages.
While  the  content  based  approaches  are  the  most  straightforward  and  obvious,  link  based  
approaches that not only look at in-link out-link statistics (shown not to be too effective against  
spam) but also more global graph structures and patterns as well as density (e.g. Gyöngyi et al.  
2005), temporal features to detect the content change over time (Dai et al. 2009; Erdélyi et al. 2009;  
Erdélyi 2011), and user data (e.g. click and query history) analysis have been shown to be effective 
in spam detection. On the other hand, it should be noted that, this type of feature set can only be 
gathered over a long period of time and after full indexing procedures.  
  
5.1.3 At the time of ranking
Spam detection and demotion at the time of ranking the results of a search issued by an end-user 
can  be  enormously  challenging:  by  the  time  we  arrive  at  this  stage,  all  traditional  detection 
algorithms have been applied, and therefore, those spam content that persist to be in the collection 
are likely to be those that are highly ranked with respect to content and links, i.e. those that have  
already passed all  the tests. However, at  the stage of ranking, we are provided with additional 
information from the query itself, i.e. spam demotion becomes a query specific task. To this effect  
some have tried to use query term counts,  e.g.  with respect  to different  parts  of  the document  
BlogForever Consortium Page 22 of 58
Figure 5.2 Mindmap snapshot of methods for detecting spams at the time of indexing
D2.5 Spam filtering report 29 February 2012
(Figure 5.3),  to improve the ranking of authentic documents.  Nevertheless,  the effectiveness of  
spam demotion is limited. 
It is deemed that spam demotion at the time of ranking can become more effective if temporal  
analysis, behaviour analysis and usage data be combined with ranking methods: for example, blog 
life cycle characteristics, out-link characteristics of the blog, and/or the usage statistics and click 
data analysis correlated to relevance judgements collected as the data is accessed through the web 
archive could be used to improve or adapt the ranking in the long term.
Learning to rank in the general web retrieval context is already a difficult  problem,  so we can 
expect  the  difficulty to  be comparable  in  the  context  of  weblogs.  On the other  hand,  weblogs 
change over time,  contain dynamic  content  and are associated to  life-cycles.  This gives  us the  
potential to produce better ranking for weblogs.
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5.2 Type of features
5.2.1 Spatial characteristics
URL pattern information
Methods using these type of features are based on the observation that:
• spammers tend to stuff the URL with combination, mutations, and permutations of context 
rich keywords to benefit from the search engine ranking that rewards these URLs
• spammers tend to use hyphens and long length URLs
• domains that are cheap to acquire, such as “.info” domains, tend to be populated with a 
higher proportion of spam sites than expensive sites such as “.edu”.
Classification based on URLs feature 3,4, and 5 n-grams (after tokenising) along with URL lengths 
and tokenisation techniques that capture usage of special symbols have been suggested by several 
researchers (e.g. Salvetti & Nicolov 2006; Kolari 2007). This approach is highly desirable because 
it prevents the spam from entering the archive in the first place (optimising storage). It also carries  
low cost (i.e. no page fetch required).
  
Home page content information
Methods here are based on the observation that:
• spammers tend to repeat the same links and keywords
• spam sites have short life span and grow very quickly
• spammers employ a high percentage of nouns and only a few pronouns characteristic of 
expression of opinions
• coherence of spam content may be lower that authentic content, that is the content would 
exhibit deviation from a general n-gram language model for n>1
• HTML templates created by automated blog creation software will be repetitive  
Classification based on the home page use out-links, anchor text, words, word grams, character 
grams, HTML tag (as a style template, see, for example, Urvoy et al. 2008), and archive dates to 
determine blog age and life cycle. To emphasise the repetitive terms and high proportion of nouns 
and named entities in spam, derived features using compression ratio and entity ratio have been  
suggested but these do not actually perform as well as the raw features (Kolari 2007). Given that  
derived features also incur increased processing and index storage overhead, it is unclear whether  
using these derived features in a large scale blog archive would be beneficial.
Feed-based information
The feature set can be strengthened by using the life cycle of blog characterised by the structured 
RSS feed (e.g. number of posts and age of blog). There has also been evidence (e.g. Section III.D of 
Kolari 2007) that the characterisation of HTML template based on RSS feeds enables the classifier 
to learn spam software detection at a faster rate than when using the home page content.
Link based relational information
The approaches using link based features are inspired by the Google PageRank25 which is based on 
the  intuition  that  pages  that  are  cited  often  are  more  likely  to  be  “important”.  This  intuition, 
25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PageRank  
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however, also inspires the spammer to create link farms  (see Chung, Toyoda, & Kitsuregawa 2009) 
that exist solely to promote affiliated web sites. Perhaps this is why Kolari (2007) finds that link 
based features such as number of out-links (the pages to which the target page points), the number  
of in-links (the pages that point to the target page), and the number of co-citations (pages to which 
other pages point at the same time as pointing to the target page), processed on their own do not out 
perform bag-of-words  approach.  On  the  other  hand,  there  has  been  evidence  that,  link  based 
features combined with usage data such as query statistics (e.g. see Castillo et al. 2008), can be  
effective.  Also,  link  based  network  structure  on  a  global  level  to  determine  a  trust  measure  
(Gyöngyi 2008) could be effective. 
5.2.2 Temporal features and user data
Most of the features discussed in Section 5.2.1 have been described in a fashion that renders them 
time independent. These kinds of features can be quite limited in its ability to fight spam which is 
adversarial  in  nature  and  perhaps  can  be  best  detected  by  characterising  the  content  change 
observed across time (e.g. Dai et al. 2009; Lin et al. 2007; Lin et al. 2008). In addition to content  
change, Erdélyi et al. (2011) showed that changes in linkage across neighbours, in-link growth and 
death also characterise spam. They measure link structural change surrounding a node using Jaccard 
similarity coefficient26. 
While these researchers have shown that temporal analysis could be effective, these still seem to  
fall behind direct content analysis. Some have also suggested monitoring changes of sites that occur  
as search results of a selected set of popular queries (e.g. Zhu et al. 2011). The latter highlights  
three observations:
• a small set of popular queries are popular for a long time
• there are a few blogs that are featured frequently in top search results of popular blogs
• some of the top search results of popular queries do not attract noticeable increment of in-
link count
They suggest that weblogs that attract few in-link increments while appearing in the top search 
results are most likely to be splogs (i.e. it is ranked highly but people do not link to it at a noticeable 
rate).  More  generally,  they  propose  that  a  concentrated  effort  to  examine  blogs  that  responds  
frequently  to  popular  queries  could  benefit  spam filtering  approaches.  Their  approach  may  be 
especially suitable for implementation at the time of ranking (Section 5.1.3). 
It has already been observed that splogs propagate, grow, and change in a way distinct from the  
space of authentic weblogs (e.g. see Fetterly et al. 2004; Bhattarai et al. 2009; Erdélyi et al. 2011). 
The keywords, repetitiveness, network structure, size, and density with respect to splogs change at a  
different rate from that observed with respect to authentic blogs.  It seems reasonable then to exploit  
these temporal  characteristics.  Some of the temporal  characteristics depends on usage data. For  
example Liu et al. (2008) present the use of user page visitation behaviour to classify spam. Their 
approach is based on the following observations:
• Users  visit  spam  pages  as  a  result  of  search  results  more  often  than  as  a  result  of  
recommendation by friends or links from legitimate web sites.
•  Spam pages are rarely recorded as source pages because links within spam pages are rarely  
clicked.
• Navigation time within spam websites is expected to be short.
These observations lead to the construction of spam detectors that employ relative counts of types  
of visits, types of clicks, and number of pages within sites visited.
26 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaccard_index
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These statistics, however, can also be affected by automated user data generation (e.g. see Buehrer 
et  al.  2008;  Duskin  and  Feitelson  2009).  The  trick  would  be  to  combine  different  source  of 
information to learn from each other, such as an ensemble classifier implemented at several stages 
of  acquiring  information  (see  the  stages  of  information  acquisition,  Section  5.1  and  adaptive 
filtering approaches, Section 5.3).
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5.3 Filtering spam adaptively
Kolari  (2007) suggested an adaptive filtering method that  used an ensemble of classifiers each 
trained on local features (i.e. no global link relation based features) URL n-gram, words, word-n-
grams, charactergrams, tags, out-links, and anchor text. An ensemble classification was performed 
using these base classifiers on unlabelled instances to improve the effectiveness of each classifier.
His  results,  however,  did not  consider  how his  adaptive methods  would fare  in  comparison  to 
adaptive methods that reflect the changes that occur to the content and network over time. Nor did  
he consider usage based features (such as visitations, query history) and global link based features 
(such as patterns of out-links and in-links). To maximise the benefit of temporal change in detecting 
spam, it is suggested that this could be a direction to explore. Adapting the spam filter based on 
usage  data,  which  the  web  archive  is  in  a  position  to  collect,  say,  by  capturing  passive  user  
interaction could be highly cost effective. This data may include query statistics, session data, and 
or click data. Active user feedback such as voting could also be considered.
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5.4 Viability feature types mentioned in the literature
As a illustration of the viability of different feature types discussed in the literature, in Table 5.1, 
selected feature types and their pros and cons have been summarised. 
 
Features Pros Cons
URL analyser/template Low process cost Limited information – not very 
adaptive to change
IP/Post frequency Could be difficult for spammers 
to manipulate
Must  have  history  of  updates 
and  could  become  quite 
involved  –  e.g.  where  is  the 
threshold for the frequency and 
how will it adapt to changes in 
the spam landscape?
Blacklist Straightforward  methodology 
and  thrid  party  support 
available
Could  lead  to  exploding 
blacklists.
RSS/content match Indicates  some  level  of 
agreement  that  the  content  is 
what the RSS feed says it is.
This requires that  RSS feed is 
already  available.  Strictly 
speaking  this  is  not  spam 
filtering.
Full content analysis Could  be  useful  for  removing 
duplicates. Difficult for spam to 
completely confound.
Could be process intensive.
User feedback High precision Labour  intensive.  Low  recall 
because  too  many  items  for 
humans to examine.
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6 Recommended spam detection strategy
According  to  the  BlogForever  Description  of  Work,  BlogForever  will  “develop  robust  digital 
preservation, management and dissemination facilities for weblogs”27. The ability of this project to 
reach these goals during the scope of this project, both effectively and efficiently, requires that we 
consider what types of collections we can reasonably expect and to anticipate our needs for spam 
filtering in relation to those expected use-cases.
Our current expectations of possible use-cases, according to the preliminary analysis of qualitative 
interviews conducted with potential future users (e.g. reported as part of BlogForever deliverable 
D4.1 “User requirements and platform specifications”), involve blog collections of two main types. 
The first type would be the collection of distinct or expert blogs, targeted by an administrator for 
specific preservation purposes and according to specific criteria. These types of collections are what  
we  expect  of  potential  users  such  as  libraries,  universities  or  organizations  that  provide  Blog 
hosting,  for  example.  The  second  type  consists  of  those  B2C consumer  blogs,  that  would  be 
potentially collected in huge volume and without prior identification. 
The BlogForever Description of Work targets two types of spam for detection28:
1. Blogs that are created for the sole purpose of raising the rank of affiliated target websites by 
linking to and supporting these websites (spam blogs or splogs)
2. Comments that are submitted to the blogs for the sole purpose of disseminating content 
irrelevant to the original post, including links to raise the rank of affiliated sites, and/or 
relaying abusive content (comment spam)  
For expert blog collections, the blogs to be preserved are expected to be chosen by an administrator, 
entailing less potential for the inclusion of spam blogs within the chosen body of blogs. For this 
reason, spam detection strategy with respect  to expert blog collections will  need to place more  
weight on comment spam. There are several ready-made, anti-spam tools with learning capabilities  
available  that  deal  with comment  spam (examples  are  discussed in  Chapter  3).  These learning  
capabilities  are  triggered when errors  of  the  anti-spam tool  are  reported back by blog  content  
moderators. These APIs will form the first stage of the BlogForever spam detection strategy. For 
the second type of collection (B2C blogs), the current weblog spider prototype architecture (Section 
6.1) suggests that ping servers will be used more extensively, making the detection of spam blogs 
more  of  a  problem.  While  it  might  be  possible  to  customise  existing  anti-spam tools  for  the 
detection of spam blogs (more on this in Section 6.2.1),  the feasibility of this  approach is  yet  
unclear.  For  both  types  of  blogs  (expert  blogs  and  consumer  blogs),  it  is  recommended  that 
intelligent blog harvesting strategies be developed to alleviate overload of URLs arriving at the 
spam detection component rather than trying to compromise the quality of the detection method 
(Section 6.3.1)
As a point of observation, even in the case of the expert blog collection, the assumption that the  
administrator will be able to list blogs relevant to the collection may become questionable in the  
future. Blogs are created at a alarming rate: for example, the number of tumblr blogs is now over 41  
million29 and the number  of  WordPress  blogs has  been reported to  be 70 million 30.  Last  year, 
Technorati  was reported to be tracking over 100 million blogs31(note that  Technorati  no longer 
indexes non-English blogs). In the plethora of emerging blogs, archivists of the future will not be  
27 Part A1: Project summary , BlogForever project Description of Work
28 covering three spam types listed on Page 28, Part B, BlogForever project Description of Work
29 http://www.tumblr.com  
30 http://royal.pingdom.com/2012/01/17/internet-2011-in-numbers/  
31 http://www.infotoday.com/linkup/lud021510-stern.shtml
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able  to  hand-pick  blogs  for  archiving,  nor  will  they  be  able  to  rely completely on  popularity 
rankings (which is almost impossible to surpass as a late-comer in the game even with high quality 
content, unless the new blogger resorts to spamming techniques themselves), to find relevant blogs. 
For example, in order to harvest and archive blogs addressing events of social significance across  
the blogosphere (not an unlikely mandate on an archivist) such as those discussed by Chen (2010), a 
blog archive administrator might need to automatically discover these blogs. In such a scenario, 
spam blog detection (not just comment spam detection) to support selection of relevant blogs will 
become necessary. In fact, in the future, it may be that the spam detection strategy will become an 
essential component of selection and appraisal procedures carried out by the archivist.
Consequently,  it  is  important  to  ensure  that  the  spam  detection  mechanism  set  up  by  the 
BlogForever archive should not falter in the continuation of its service and in the maintenance of  
the quality of its service. As such, the design of a spam detection strategy for a robust weblog 
archive  should  not  depend  solely  on  closed  third-party  tools.  A  third-party  service  could  be  
discontinued at  any time  and development  could cease at  any time  (i.e.  no longer  evolving in 
response to new emerging knowledge about spam). While the continuation and evolution of these 
tools to meet the demands of the user community is likely, and modifications might be possible on a 
need-to-do basis, there is no guarantee. To ignore the ramifications of such a risk goes against good 
archiving, repository management, and digital preservation practices. 
In response, in addition to the first stage of spam detection carried out by third-party APIs (Section  
6.2.1),  a  second stage detection  based on statistical  methods  is  proposed as  a  backup strategy 
(Section 6.2.2). The second stage detection will also be carried out at the time of web crawling, i.e.  
the spam detection will  be in full  cooperation with the BlogForever weblog spider. In fact,  the  
design of the spam detection framework has been configured to meet the general recommendations  
presented in the BlogForver deliverable D2.4 BlogForever weblog spider prototype (see discussion 
in Section 6.1). 
The basic step for a spam detection module takes an input candidate and determines the likelihood 
of it being spam or not (Figure 6.1). Once the input is flagged as spam, it can be ignored, kept  
within the archive, reported to a spam database, or collected in a separate location as part of an 
internal spam database of the archive. The course of action would depend on the goals, policies,  
objectives, mandates, and legal requirements imposed on the archive.
While the retention of spam will  pose a considerable burden on a web archive (in light of  the 
organisation’s  data  storage capacity),  as  illustrated in  the  introduction to  this  report,  spam has 
distinctive historical, research, and commercial value. To repeat, spam tells a story about how the 
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adversarial  development  of  technology  versus  spam  has  evolved  over  the  years.  Thus,  we 
recommend that all spam or some selected portion of spam should be preserved as part of future  
web archiving initiatives. Regardless of the policy on storing (or not storing) spam, however, the  
URL of  the  flagged  spam should  be  communicated  to  the  Source  Database  (see  Section  6.1)  
specified  in  the  BlogForever  deliverable  D2.4  Weblog  Spider  Prototype  and  Associated 
Methodology to be used for URL blacklist analysis.
Finally, in Section 6.3, we have proposed some end-user mechanisms that might be integrated into 
the User Interface design and repository Data Management framework that could further support 
the spam handling strategy of the BlogForver archive.
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6.1 Spam  detection  strategy  and  the  BlogForever  spider 
prototype
The  final  spam  detection  strategy  must  be  designed  to  fit  in  with  other  components  of  the 
BlogForver archive implementation.  Further,  the spam detection component  should involve low 
cost in implementation, processing, and maintenance. To support low cost, the spam detection will  
be  limited  to  take  place  during  or  right  after  the  web crawling  or  spidering  process,  so  as  it  
decreases  involvement  with  the  more  complex  architecture  of  the  repository.  The BlogForever 
spider will  be prototyped,  designed and implemented as part of BlogForever deliverables D2.4,  
D4.2,  and  D4.3,  respectively.  Already,  in  the  deliverable  D2.4,  it  was  proposed  that  the  spam 
detection takes place in two places: using a URL blacklist stored in the Source Database (“Source  
DB” in Figure  6.2),  coming from previous instances  of  spam detection,  and using the fetched 
content (see “Spam filter” component in Figure 6.2) in relation to either the Host Analyzer or the  
Worker stage of the spidering process. By adhering to the architecture suggested in D2.4, we can 
ensure  compatibility  between the  spam detection strategy and the  general  BlogForever  archive 
implementation.
The discussion in the D2.4 deliverable suggests (Section 4.2.4, D2.4), as first line of defence against 
spam, the elimination of URLs that:
• do not match acceptable blog formats (based on an ID3 decision tree algorithm),
• have splog-like characteristics (e.g. high volume of associated updates and pings),
• do not lead to the identification of valid RSS feeds for blogs and blog posts,
• lead to mismatch of RSS and HTML content using Levenshtein distance.
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Figure 6.2 BlogForever Spider Prototype Architecture (Section 4.2.4, BlogForever deliverable D2.4 
“Weblog spider prototype”). Spam detection is part of the “Worker” stage of the prototype.
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Further suggestions made by deliverable D2.432 includes the use of heuristic scoring functions based 
on in-link statistics and spam scores of posts, mentioned by Wu (2007), as well as, a list of derived 
features,  mentioned  by  Kolari  (2007).  While  the  steps  to  examine  URL  characteristics  are 
reasonable precautions within any web spidering frameworks that aim to retrieve authentic blogs, 
the features proposed in Section 3.5 of the deliverable pose a couple of immediately observable  
problems. The distributional characteristics proposed by Wu (2007) is based on data and even usage 
data (e.g. query logs) collected over a considerable time period. At the initial period of launching 
the archive this kind of data is limited. Also, characteristics such as in-link increase rate can be 
manipulated by a clever spammer, say, for instance, more easily than linguistic elements such as  
indent and coherence. 
Also, the derived features described by Kolari (2007) take time to extract, and, further, it should be 
noted that Kolari (2007) observes, in his experimentations, that the performance of spam detection 
based on these derived features do not lead to as good a performance as that obtained from raw 
features (e.g. bag of words, n-grams, anchor text). For example, he reports that derived features at  
its best achieve an accuracy rate of 0.75, while classification on the bag of words method achieves 
0.9 accuracy. Consequently, we recommend that the initial approaches be limited to the use of raw 
features.
Graham  (2003)  who  also  uses  statistical  methods  on  words  (he  does  not  distinguish  header 
information from content) reports that 99.75% of his email spam was caught by his Bayes spam 
filtering method33 and he measured a false positive rate of 0.06%. Admittedly,  his method was 
applied on email, and it is questionable whether the same methodology would apply to blog posts, 
but his philosophy seems sound: he contends that strategies based on heuristics can eventually be  
out smarted by a clever spammer, and that strategies based on deep language processing techniques  
are more robust because the message of the spam has to be explicitly or implicitly (as the target of a 
link, for example) embedded in the post. 
Based  on  the  finding  of  Kolari  (2007)  and  Graham  (2003),  it  is  recommended  that  any 
implementation of the BlogForever spam detection strategy going beyond the integration of ready 
made API (e.g. those mentioned in Chapter 3), use raw features such as words in the content rather  
than derived or heuristic features.
32 Section 3.5, D2.4
33 http://paulgraham.com/better.html
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6.2 Blogforever spam detection methodology
In this section, we have described two core phases intended to form the basis of the BlogForever  
spam filtering strategy. The initial stages of the first phase described in Section 6.2.1 (based on 
looking up blacklisted IP/URLs and/or URL pattern rules) is largely independent of the content of 
the target page, post or comment. However, it might be commented here that URL lists or pattern 
based  methods  are  not  reliable  in  the  long  term,  as  this  is  something  that  spammers  change  
frequently  for  the  very  reason  that  it  is  the  first  line  of  defence  used  in  any  spam detection 
methodology.  On the other hand the volume of URLs arriving at the ping server (the source of 
harvest suggested suggested within BlogForever deliverable D2.4) makes it difficult to examine the 
target content of each URL. There seem to be only two immediate solutions available for dealing 
with this dilemma:
1. The  creation  and  maintenance  of  multiple  spam  filtering  agents  on  several  servers 
assigned with limited number of URLs.
2. The design of an intelligent spidering strategy for harvest in parallel to the update strategy 
suggested in D2.4. that moves away from the breadth-first harvest at the ping server to  
depth-first  harvest  sourced through identified non-spam blogs (see Section 6.3.1).  The 
depth-first harvest increases the likelihood that material relevant to material already in the 
collection is being collected, and also encourages the collection to approximate the single 
network  of  linked  pages  (i.e.  the  statistics  used  in  link-based  ranking  becomes  more  
accurate).
The first of these may be only a temporary solution as the number of URLs at the ping server may 
grow at an accelerated rate in the future. While the possibility of extensive investigations in the  
direction of the second solution may be limited within the BlogForever project, it is recommended 
that future archiving initiatives give it serious consideration.
The latter part of the first phase (blog identification and the use of anti-spam APIs) and the second 
phase (section 6.2.2) of the spam detection (adaptive ensemble classifiers) relies on some form of 
blog content. It should be pointed out, however, that the term content here does not necessarily refer  
to comment, post, or page content associated to the URL. Even with the information received at the  
ping server only, access to title, url and links to RSS is available. These features may be used in the 
first instance as content submitted to APIs and/or to apply the other approaches outlined in Section 
6.2.2 at an early stage to eliminate obvious instances of spam. For this reason, the strategy has made  
no  distinction  between splog  detection  and content  spam detection:  the  philosophy behind  the 
simplified strategy suggested here, at  least within the limits  of present  resources,  is to cast the 
detection of different types of spam instances as a question of considering content and links and 
changes thereof at different levels of granularity, and at different time periods in the repository life  
cycle.
Finally, it should be noted that none of the strategies outlined here is intended for blog platform 
providers and is intended for use within retrospective weblog repositories created after blogs and  
their content have been published within the blogosphere.
6.2.1 IP and URL Blacklist/Whitelist lookup, blog detection, and third-party 
APIs 
This stage of the spam detection is designed to reduce the spam detection process overhead by 
carrying  out  simple  IP and URL matching against  blacklisted and whitelisted IP addresses and 
URLs, leaving more sophisticated methods for later to be applied on a smaller set of data. All three  
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steps are expected to be carried out during the Host Analyzer  stage of the weblog spider  (see  
Figure 6.2).
Blacklist/Whitelist Lookup
As mentioned in Section 6.1, the BlogForever weblog spider prototype already incorporates part of  
the first and second steps (URL lookup and blog detection) of this detection stage. However, we 
propose here three improvements of the already implemented steps: 
1. In  addition  to  URLs,  IP  addresses,  if  available,  could  be  checked  against  a  blacklist 
database. It has been observed (e.g. by Kolari 2007) that the same IP addresses use different  
URLs to avoid being caught as spam.
2. The dnspython  toolkit34 could be used to look up URLs associated to a selected IP address  
mapped to a rejected URL. Associated URL can be added to the Source Database suspected 
URL list.
3. In addition to storing internally detected suspect URLS in the Source Database, it might be 
worth exploring external APIs, for example, that from SplogSpot (http://splogspot.com/) to 
check for blacklisted IP addresses and URL.  This is  to circumvent  the fact  that,  at  the 
beginning, there are very few suspect addresses recorded in the Source Database.
Blog detection/identification
The weblog spider also already incorporates simple blog detection techniques using URL format 
analysis, RSS check (URLs without RSS links are rejected),  and RSS validation against content. In  
conjunction with query logs (see discussion of usage data in Section 6.3), a detection method based  
on the number of popular query words in the URL has been shown to be an indicator of spam blogs 
(Kolari 2007). 
While an additional backup strategy based on weblog structure (drawing on the elements of blogs 
that have been identified as part of the work presented in the BlogForever deliverable D2.2, “Report 
on  Weblog  Data  Model”),  and  Kolari’s  support  vector  machine  detection  method  using  a  
combination of binary features coming from words in the content and page URL (this combination 
was reported to have best performance resulting in precision 0.985 and recall of 0.966) would be 
useful,  the increase in overhead may make it  not  worth implementation.  It  is  proposed that,  if 
resources are available, a test be conducted to evaluate the accuracy of this strategy against the 
projected increase in overhead.
Third-party API
In Chapter 3, we discussed a range of ready-made third-party anti-spam APIs. There is a wrapper in  
many languages for most of these APIs. Python API, wrappers, or code examples for most of these  
APIs have been provided in Appendix A. The focus on python is due to the awareness that the 
BlogForever repository software Invenio is based on python and also that python is recognised an 
ideal  language  for  efficient  string  processing35.  We  have  not  included  BadBehaviour  and 
SpamKarma in the discussion here. Although there is still a strong support from the community for 
these anti-spam services, they have been known to be described process intensive36.
34 http://www.dnspython.org  
35 http://stackoverflow.com/questions/635155/best-language-for-string-manipulation  
36 http://wordpress.org/support/topic/bad-behavior-and-admin-ajaxphp-crawl-backend  
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The  methods  available  to  each  of  these  APIs  are  slightly  different.  Akismet  python  API37 is 
undoubtedly  the  simplest  including  four  methods  for  verifying  a  submitted  key,  checking  a 
comment for spam, and reporting back spam and ham, respectively. A sample code is presented in 
Appendix  A.1.2.  The  same  API  can  be  used  for  TypePad  antispam (Appendix  A.4)  with  the  
appropriate key. 
Defensio  also  comes  with  a  python  library38 (see  Appendix  A.3).  Unlike  Akismet,  Defensio 
provides a score of spaminess. The latter functionality might be useful in other ways as well. For  
example, if the spaminess level is low then we might allow its inclusion into the repository but  
make use of this as a feature in tagging or ranking the blog post at the time of displaying it to the 
end-user of the archive. Further functionalities of the Defensio API is available as a pdf document  
at: http://download.defensio.com/docs/api/defensio_api_2.0.pdf
In addition to APIs mentioned in Chapter 3, there are also services like BlogSpam 39 (Appendix 
A.5). Comments can be submitted through a server proxy API using XML-RPC standards. Unlike 
other offerings listed here, with BlogSpam,  you can run your  own service by downloading the  
code40. However, there may be little support for the python and/or other languages in this case.  
There is also the Trac project SpamFilter41, which operates as a bridge across these different API to 
allow customised selection of any of these API. It  also provides a gateway to specialised spam 
filters such as StopForumSpam42 and LinkSleeve43, as well as, access to a range of internal spam 
filtering strategies including tools for implementing a trained Bayes spam filter. Python codes using 
the Trac SpamFilter and each of these API are at the SpamFilter website. As an example, however,  
the  sample  code  for  the  implementation  of  Akismet  within  this  context  has  been  included  in 
Appendix A.6.
One  widely  used  external  anti-spam  service  that  is  not  included  in  the  Trac  SpamFiltering 
framework is Mollom (see Chapter 3).  An independent  python wrapper for the Mollom API is  
available at http://www.itkovian.net/base/python-wrapper-mollom/ 
Ideally,  we  would like  to  propose  that  several  APIs  be used in  parallel.  We could not  find a 
reference to such a use case at the time of writing this report but perhaps three or more spam filter 
APIs can be operated as a committee of spam filters. This can be applied to incoming posts and  
comments.  The  output  can  be  also  tagged  with  Defensio’s  spaminess  index  for  later  use  (see 
discussion above). If a post is identified as spam then the website is suspect and can be greylisted.  
Greylisted websites can be assumed to be spam blogs or further examined by retrieving further  
posts and comments from the site for examination. 
A committee of spam filters can be either implemented through Trac SpamFilter (this has not been  
tested for feasibility yet), or independently scripted. The effort in creating a committee should be 
minimal. 
Additionally, the use of blekko44 should be investigated. blekko claims to be a spam free search 
engine for the web. They use slashtags (indicated topic/genre) curated by experts to eliminate spam 
37 http://www.voidspace.org.uk/python/akismet_python.html   
38 http://www.defensio.com/downloads/python/  
39 http://  www.  blog  spam.net   
40 http://blogspamnetapi.codeplex.com/releases/view/62472  
41 http://trac.edgewall.org/wiki/SpamFilter  
42 http://stopforumspam.com/   
43 http://linksleeve.org/  
44 http://www.blekko.com   
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websites.  They claim that  an  API  is  available  that  will  allow external  applications  to  use  the 
slashtags. However, how easy it is to use the API is yet unknown, and whether it can be applied to 
the blog context is questionable. For example, the content they index may not include many blogs.  
 
6.2.2 Ensemble adaptation framework
The steps in Section 6.2.1 will reduce the scope of sites that need serious analysis. The next stage of  
spam filtering  is  designed  to  support  simplicity  while  enabling  adaptability.  An  automatically 
adapting spam detection strategy may involve some cost at the beginning of its implementation but 
will have an advantage in the long run by reducing the necessity of manual intervention for the 
maintenance, improvement, and retraining of the spam detector.
Many researchers engineer features (see derived features – e.g. compression ratio and entity ratios 
described by Kolari 2007; and link structural coefficients used by Erdélyi et al. 2011) or select the 
best ones from a big pool of features. This approach generally creates a fast learning curve at the  
beginning,  and  is  perfect  for  finding  local  optima,  but  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  a  global  
optimum. In fact, Kolari (2007) shows that the use of poor base classifiers to build an ensemble  
adaptive framework is effective in achieving relatively high performance levels at a later stage of  
the  learning  process  (reaching  precision  and  recall  of  approximately  92% and  94% across  all 
classifiers – some of these classifiers started off at less than 84% precision and 71% recall). 
He also presents evidence that supervised classifiers using Support Vector Machine algorithms on 
raw content features (e.g. words) performs better than those based on derived features (e.g. ratio  
between words belonging to different part of speech). He also shows that simple link features (e.g.  
number of in-links; number of out-links; number of sites co-cited with the target site) are not as 
effective as word features. While some researchers (e.g. Wu 2007) have shown that in-link growth 
rate is a good indicator of spaminess, these are features that can be captured over a considerable  
period of time (see also discussion at end of Section 6.1).  Also, note that the more derived the 
feature is, the more expensive the process will be to capture it, and difficult to efficiently integrate 
into the rest of crawling, and indexing system of the repository. 
Here we suggest an ensemble frame work with poor base classifiers distributed across those trained  
on content features (e.g. base classifiers presented by Kolari 2007), link structural features (e.g. in-
link counts, out-link counts, network node degrees; see also Erdélyi et al. 2011), temporal features  
(e.g. changes of content and link features). These can then be used independently as the basis for a  
classifier using a variation of Naïve Bayes (see Appendix B.1 for a simple implementation of, for 
example, Graham’s Bayes spam filter45) and/or Support Vector Machine46 (see how it is used in 
Appendix B.2) to form an ensemble of classifiers that can learn from each other, without manual  
input. In the first instance, the ensemble classifier labels a new candidate for spam detection using 
the averaged probability across all classifiers. The new labelled instance is used to re-trained and 
hopefully improve each individual classifier (see Figure 6.3).
Initially we suggest only three sets of features (resulting in three classifiers): 
• tokenized content  (this is  the entire HTML for the content  retrieved before parsing the  
HTML),
• link structure features including number of in-links, number of out-links, number of co-
cited sites (if possible), 
45 http://www.paulgraham.com/spam.html   
46 http://tfinley.net/software/svmpython1  
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• temporal features that track changes in the tokenized content, link numbers and co-citation 
numbers since the last update as a ratio with respect to time. 
Not all of the features will be available in the first instance. To compensate we could first work with 
a single content based classifier, followed by new classifiers based on link features and temporal  
features (and, even later, classifiers based on features derived from end-user activity) added to the  
ensemble at a later date. In fact, the ensemble spam detection strategy can be introduced at a later  
date based on a small samples of posts and comments labelled as spam or non-spam as a result of  
the spam detection carried out by the committee of ready-made anti-spam APIs (Section 6.2.1).
Because the features described above are very basic features of a webpage, the implementation of  
the framework will not be incur extra labour with respect to data extraction (that is, these features  
need to be extracted as a matter of course during indexing and can be partially communicated back 
to the spam detector). Support vector machines can, however, be quite process intensive (which is 
why a lighter version of the algorithm has been suggested – Appendix B.2) so depending on the 
volume of classification, it might be better to select a simplified Bayes classification approach (such 
as that presented in Appendix B.1). 
Note that the features for the individual classifiers are all features that need to be extracted anyway 
as important aspects of the blog as part of the data extraction framework. Later, if resources permit  
it, an advanced module could be developed to build other classifiers into the ensemble including 
one based on user data features (visitation statistics and browsing history, such as that presented by 
Zhu et al. 2011; query log statistics such as that presented by Castillo et al. 2008) to augment the 
ensemble.
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D2.5 Spam filtering report 29 February 2012
6.2.3 Requirements for the implementation of the spam detection strategy
In Sections 6.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, we described the steps for an efficient spam detection strategy to be  
employed within the BlogForever weblog archive. We summarise the workflow in three phases  
(Figure 6.4). The first two phases (Phase 1, described in Section 6.2.1, and, Phase 2, described in  
Section 6.2.2 ) form the core components of the detection strategy. In this section we discuss the  
requirements of these two phases. The details of Phase 3 is discussed in Section 6.3.
Training data for the ensemble classifier
 
Since it is unlikely that the spam detection component will have access to explicit user feedback, 
the Phase 2 component of the spam detection strategy will lack the training data to initiate the base 
classifiers. Although, this data could be obtained externally (say, for example, through SplogSpot or 
Technorati), a better strategy for the archive is to feed a portion of the labelled result of Phase 1, 
initially,  as training data for Phase 2. This would make the data more domain specific (that is,  
relevant  to  the  collection  objectives  –  both  for  BlogForever,  and  for  future  archives),  and  the 
classifiers are likely to perform better when trained on representative datasets. 
Considerations with respect to indexing
The training of the ensemble classifier  does not necessarily depend on the full  indexing of the 
collection, as you might do within the repository. The initial statistics that drives the classification 
can be based on the statistics of all the spam considered together as one document and all the non-
spam (a.k.a ham) considered together as one document. Also, the document vectors can be reduced 
in dimension on the basis of the top 20 most distinguishing words in the document.
Not all features will be available from the beginning
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While there is always some content associated to a blog candidate for inclusion into the repository,  
links (incoming and outgoing) and changes of content and links may not be available at the outset.  
This can be handled by initially only introducing the content-based classifier augmented by a link-
based   classifier  and  a  classifier  using  temporal  features  (changes  in  content  and  links)  when 
information on these features become available.
Defining what we mean by content
In  extracting  content  to  be  submitted  to  the  APIs  and  ensemble  classifier,  while  we  suggest  
tokenizing of HTML and URL content, it is not assumed that we will be removing structural and 
header information in the form of HTNL or XML from the page or message before submitting it to 
the relevant classifiers. For example, Graham (2003) found that, in the case of email, the inclusion  
of header information as part of the content improved classification. It is suggested that initially we 
do not rip content from HTML and evaluate efficacy before taking this step. If we do not need to 
parse html, time and processing intensity can be reduced.
Mapping the spam detection Phase 1 and 2 onto the weblog spider
Both Phases 1 and 2 can be implemented at several stages of the weblog spider (Section 6.1). As  
mentioned  earlier,  while  the  amount  of  information  available  at  different  stages  of  the  crawl 
(updates from the ping, updates from the RSS feed, and update of the target page content) will  
differ, it should also be noted that there will always some content available. 
Step 1: Weblog spider Host Analyzer 
At  this stage of the weblog spider we will only have information received from the ping server. 
Nevertheless, even at this stage, we have access to the title,  url,  rss link (while not all  updates 
received at the ping server is accompanied by rss links, it has already been suggested that only 
URLs with RSS feeds be considered for inclusion into the repository. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
discard updates at the ping server that come without RSS links). This content satisfies the minimum 
requirements for information to be submitted to the APIs and ensemble classifiers.  
Step 2: Weblog spider Worker 
The RSS feed for the URLs that have passed the title, URL, and RSS link check in Step 1, will be  
retrieved  at  this  stage.  Once  the  RSS feed  is  available,  we  will  have  content  from posts  and  
comments available as well as url, title and RSS link. This in turn can be submitted to the suggested 
committee of APIs and the ensemble classifier.
Step 3: after the full content has been fetched by the weblog spider
For URLs surviving the classification at Step 1 and 2, we arrive at Step 3 which is based on the  
submission of full webpage content to  the APIs and ensemble classifier.
In the next section we will  discuss some approaches that can be implemented within the wider 
content of the repository to support spam detection, and, more generally, selection and appraisal.  
For example, user feedback (e.g. spam reports from users of the archive) could be collected to 
inform the Source Database of the weblog spider and the API servers to improve Phase 1 (by 
updating black lists and utilising the API adaptive functionalities) and Phase 2 (by updating the 
training data). Also, it might be possible to improve the weblog spidering strategy with respect to 
aggregating repository content  beyond  that  received  from a general  ping  server  to  avoid large 
volumes of URL at earlier stages of the detection.
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6.3 Other means of handling spam
In addition to the two proposed phases described in Sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2, and 6.2.3, in this section,  
we list a few related areas of research regarding repository design that we believe to be relevant to 
spam detection. Apart from the direct spam filtering method that have been proposed so far in this 
report,  another  way to fight  spam cost-effectively is  to make improvements  to  the  information 
retrieval strategy. That is, by ranking truly relevant material higher, we can make spam effectively  
invisible without actively removing them. In relation to this, we point to four different research  
areas for improving retrieval.
6.3.1 What we crawl and have in the collection affects retrieval performance
It has been noted that crawling policy on retrieval performance (Fetterly et al. 2009) affects the  
performance  of  the  retrieval  algorithm.  That  is,  different  collections  respond differently to  the 
algorithms  we use.  For  example,  web spidering approaches could follow the “breadth-first”  or 
“depth-first” approach. Some have observed that prioritising depth could improve the usability of  
the collection. While this is in the context of general web, analogous strategies may exist with  
respect to blogs. Hypothetically, for example, while comments can be submitted from outside the 
blog author’s circle, it may be less likely that posts are submitted by suspect contributors. Hence, if 
the blog has already been identified as authentic information found within the posts might be a  
source for finding more authentic blogs by association. It is recommended that such strategies be 
investigated.  
6.3.2 Option to report spam: a way to improve the user interface?
The ready-made APIs discussed in this report rely on user reports of erroneously labelled spam and  
ham (non-spam) to learn to classify spam more accurately. In the way we are using the APIs, it is  
difficult to report back spam to the API servers, because explicit human moderation of the data  
labelled as ham and spam is not configured into the design (as it is in the context of active blog  
plugins).  It  could  result  in  continued  poor  performance  of  the  APIs  on  blogs  that  meet  the 
requirements of the archive. If we use the blogs labelled by the APIs for Phase 2, this error may be  
propagated. Incorporating a mechanism to allow users of the archive to report spam within the user 
interface could, therefore, prove useful. Recorded spam reports can be also used to improve the  
search results displayed within the user interface.
6.3.3 Using click, query and usage data regarding blogs to improve search
User  implicit  feedback  models  (e.g.  Joachims  and  Radlinski  2007)  information  retrieval 
performance has been reported in recent years. For example, some have observed that, while clicks 
do not indicate relevance in itself, clicks may indicate that the clicked item is more relevant than  
those preceding the item in the list. Also, some of the strategies that have been suggested for spam 
filtering in recent years depend on the use of user data features (visitation statistics and browsing 
history, such as that presented by Zhu et al. 2011; query log statistics such as that presented by 
Castillo et al. 2008). It is, therefore, recommended that user data (visitation statistics, download 
frequency,  queries and click data) be recorded and managed as part of the repository design, if  
possible. Usage data of selected blogs may become especially useful for improvements in ranking 
and  spam detection.  Some  of  the  data  here  could  be  used  for  IP  analysis  (see  discussion  of  
dnspython toolkit in Section 6.2.1) to populate and update whitelists with respect to the Source 
Database.   
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7 Conclusions
In this report, we have presented a survey of web spam filtering methods relevant to blog spam 
detection. We have looked at different types of spam that have infiltrated the Blogosphere (Chapter 
2),  discussed the pros and cons of different ready-made APIs and tools (Chapter 3 and Section  
6.2.1), presented an overview of the research landscape in the area of spam detection (Chapter 5),  
and proposed what we view to be a feasible two-phase spam detection strategy for implementation 
as a component in the BlogForever weblog archive (Sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3): consisting of,
1. Phase 1: spam detection carried out by a committee of APIs
2. Phase 2: spam detection carried out by an ensemble of adaptive base classifiers built on 
three independent sets of features.
The  proposed strategy has  been  designed to  conform to  the  architecture  of  the  weblog spider 
described in  Deliverable  D2.4 of  the  BlogForever  project.  The strategy described,  however,  is  
subject  to  modifications  dependent  on  further  discussions  and  research  results  within  the 
BlogForver project, especially with respect to future finding related to repository and weblog spider 
design (Work Package 4 of the BlogForever project). 
We have also discussed some factors involving the design of the repository that might affect the 
handling of spam (Section 6.3),  as points of consideration in the next steps of the BlogForever 
repository  design.  Where  appropriate,  we  have  also  suggested  improvements  that  might  be 
introduced in the future, should the resources of the BlogForever project, or organisations adopting 
the platform, allow investigations in that direction. Spam detection is a complex problem and the 
proposed  strategy  for  its  detection  is  a  naïve  approach  at  best.  The  main  objective  of  the 
BlogForever  project  is  not  in  the  development  of  spam  detectors.  As  such  resources  for  its  
development are deemed to be limited. 
As a concluding comment, we would like to add that there was one final component missing in the 
strategy  described:  this  must  consist  of  a  vigilant  continuation  of  investigations  into  new 
technologies that  might  become available.  Spam is adversarial,  that  is,  the better  we make our 
technologies for discovery, research, interpretation, and search, the cleverer the spam will become.  
It is very unlikely that the solution developed now will last into the future.
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A. Appendix A - Anti-spam API and example use cases
A.1 Akismet
A.1.1 Akismet python API
Located at http://www.voidspace.org.uk/python/akismet_python.html
A.1.2 Example use case for Akismet python API
A.2 Mollom
A.2.1 Python wrapper for Mollom API
Located at https://github.com/itkovian/PyMollom
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api = Akismet(agent='Test Script')
# if apikey.txt is in place,
# the key will automatically be set
# or you can call ``api.setAPIKey()``
#
if api.key is None:
   print "No 'apikey.txt' file."
elif not api.verify_key():
   print "The API key is invalid."
else:
   # data should be a dictionary of values
   # They can all be filled in with defaults
   # from a CGI environment
   if api.comment_check(comment, data):
        print 'This comment is spam.'
   else:
        print 'This comment is ham.'
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A.3 Defensio
A.3.1 Python package for Defensio API
Located at http://www.defensio.com/downloads/python/





from defensio import * 
class TestDefensio(unittest.TestCase): 
  def is_python3(self): 
    return sys.version_info[0] == 3 
  def setUp(self): 
    # Set this to an actual key before running tests 
    self.api_key = 'retrainer_key' 
    self.client = Defensio(self.api_key) 
  def testGenerateUrls(self): 
    self.assertEqual("/2.0/users/" + self.api_key + ".json", self.client._generate_url_path()) 
    self.assertEqual("/2.0/users/"  +  self.api_key  +  "/action1.json"%locals(), 
self.client._generate_url_path('action1')) 
    self.assertEqual("/2.0/users/"  +  self.api_key  +  "/action1/id1.json"%locals(),  
self.client._generate_url_path('action1', 'id1')) 
  def testGetUser(self): 
    status, result = self.client.get_user() 
    self.assertEqual(200, status) 
    self.assertEqual(dict, type(result['defensio-result'])) 
    result_body = result['defensio-result'] 
    self.assertEqual('success', result_body['status']) 
    self.assertEqual('', result_body['message']) 
    self.assertEqual('2.0', result_body['api-version']) 
    if self.is_python3(): 
      self.assertEqual(str, type(result_body['owner-url'])) 
    else: 
      self.assertEqual(unicode, type(result_body['owner-url'])) 
    self.assertTrue(len(result_body['owner-url']) > 0 ) 
  def testPostDocumentWhenFail(self): 
    doc = {'content': 'Hi Hola Salut'} 
47 The code is from: https://github.com/defensio/defensio-python/blob/master/test/defensio_test.py 
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    status, result = self.client.post_document(doc) 
    self.assertEqual(200, status) 
    self.assertEqual(dict, type(result['defensio-result'])) 
    result_body = result['defensio-result'] 
    self.assertEqual('fail', result_body['status']) 
    self.assertEqual('The  following  fields  are  missing  but  required:  platform,  type',  
result_body['message']) 
    self.assertEqual('2.0', str(result_body['api-version'])) 
  def testPostDocumentWhenSuccessThenPutThenGet(self): 
    doc = {'content': 'Hi Hola Salut', 'type' : 'comment', 'platform' : 'python-test'} 
    status, result = self.client.post_document(doc) 
    self.assertEqual(200, status) 
    self.assertEqual(dict, type(result['defensio-result'])) 
    result_body = result['defensio-result'] 
    self.assertEqual('success', result_body['status']) 
    self.assertEqual('', result_body['message']) 
    self.assertEqual('2.0', str(result_body['api-version'])) 
    self.assertAlmostEqual(0.05, result_body['spaminess']) 
    self.assertEqual('legitimate', result_body['classification']) 
    self.assert_(result_body['profanity-match'] == False or result_body['profanity-match'] == None) 
    self.assertTrue(result_body['allow']) 
    
    if self.is_python3(): 
      self.assertEqual(str, type( result_body['signature'] )) 
    else: 
      self.assertEqual(unicode, type( result_body['signature'] )) 
    signature = result_body['signature'] 
    status, put_result = self.client.put_document(signature, {'allow' : 'false'}) 
    self.assertEqual(200, status) 
    put_result_body = put_result['defensio-result'] 
    self.assertEqual('success', put_result_body['status']) 
    status, get_result = self.client.get_document(signature) 
    self.assertFalse(get_result['defensio-result']['allow']) 
  def testProfanityFilter(self): 
    doc = {'bad' : 'some fucking cursing here', 'good' : 'Hey... how is it going?'} 
    status, res = self.client.post_profanity_filter(doc) 
    self.failIfEqual(403,  status,  "Seems  like  the  profanity  filter  is  not  enabled  for  key:  "  + 
self.api_key + " ") 
    self.assertEqual(200, status) 
    self.assertEqual('Hey... how is it going?', res['defensio-result']['filtered']['good']) 
    self.assertEqual('some ****ing cursing here', res['defensio-result']['filtered']['bad']) 
  def testBasicStats(self): 
    status, res = self.client.get_basic_stats() 
    self.assertEqual(200, status) 
    result_body = res['defensio-result'] 
BlogForever Consortium Page 49 of 58
D2.5 Spam filtering report 29 February 2012
    self.assertEqual('success', result_body['status']) 
    self.assertEqual(set(['status', 'false-positives', 'false-negatives', 'unwanted', 'legitimate', 'learning',  
'api-version', 'learning-status', 'message', 'accuracy']), set(result_body.keys())) 
  def testExtendedStats(self): 
    data = {'from' : '2010-01-01', 'to' : '2010-01-04'} 
    status, res = self.client.get_extended_stats(data) 
    self.assertEqual(200, status) 
    result_body = res['defensio-result'] 
    self.assertEqual('success', res['defensio-result']['status']) 
  def testHandlePostDocumentAsyncCallback(self): 
    if self.is_python3(): 
      handle_post_document_async_callback( b'{"defensio-result": {"status": "success"}}' ) 
    else: 
      handle_post_document_async_callback( '{"defensio-result": {"status": "success"}}' ) 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
  unittest.main()
A.4 TypePad Anti-Spam
The python package for TypePad Anti-Spam is provided through the Akismet API, and, therefore,  
there is no separate implementation. See Appendix A.1.
A.5 BlogSpam
The BlogSpam server is available through an XML-RPC based API. More information is available 
at http://blogspam.net/api/ 
A sample python code for accessing this API is provided below:
#! /usr/bin/python
from xmlrpclib import ServerProxy, Error
if __name__=='__main__':
        server=ServerProxy('http://test.blogspam.net:8888/')
        comment_details={
                        'ip':'1.2.3.4',
                        'email':'pvsnpnutter@nutters.com',
                        'name':'nutcase',
                        'comment':'some comment'
                        }
        try:
                print server.testComment(comment_details)
        except Error, v:
                print v
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A.6 Akismet within Trac SpamFilter48
From:
http://trac.edgewall.org/browser/plugins/0.12/spam-filter-captcha/tracspamfilter/filters/akismet.py 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
#
# Copyright (C) 2005-2006 Edgewall Software
# Copyright (C) 2005-2006 Matthew Good <trac@matt-good.net>
# Copyright (C) 2006 Christopher Lenz <cmlenz@gmx.de>
# All rights reserved.
#
# This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
# you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
# are also available at http://trac.edgewall.com/license.html.
#
# This software consists of voluntary contributions made by many
# individuals. For the exact contribution history, see the revision
# history and logs, available at http://projects.edgewall.com/trac/.
#
# Author: Matthew Good <trac@matt-good.net>
#         Christopher Lenz <cmlenz@gmx.de>
from email.Utils import parseaddr
from urllib import urlencode
import urllib2
from pkg_resources import get_distribution
from trac import __version__ as TRAC_VERSION
from trac.config import IntOption, Option
from trac.core import *
from trac.mimeview.api import is_binary
from tracspamfilter.api import IFilterStrategy
class AkismetFilterStrategy(Component):
    """Spam filter using the Akismet service (http://akismet.com/).
    
    Based on the `akismet` Python module written by Michael Ford:
      http://www.voidspace.org.uk/python/modules.shtml#akismet
    """
    implements(IFilterStrategy)
    
    noheaders  =  ['HTTP_COOKIE',  'HTTP_HOST', 
'HTTP_REFERER','HTTP_USER_AGENT',
                 'HTTP_AUTHORIZATION']
    karma_points = IntOption('spam-filter', 'akismet_karma', '5',
        """By how many points an Akismet reject impacts the overall karma 
of
        a submission.""")
    api_key = Option('spam-filter', 'akismet_api_key', '',
        """Wordpress key required to use the Akismet API.""")
48 From http://trac.edgewall.org/browser/plugins/0.12/spam-filter-captcha/tracspamfilter/filters/akismet.py
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    api_url  =  Option('spam-filter',  'akismet_api_url', 
'rest.akismet.com/1.1/',
        """URL of the Akismet service.""")
    user_agent = 'Trac/%s | SpamFilter/%s'  % (
        TRAC_VERSION, get_distribution('TracSpamFilter').version
    )
    def __init__(self):
        self.verified_key = None
    # IFilterStrategy implementation
    def is_external(self):
        return True
            
    def test(self, req, author, content, ip):
        if not self._check_preconditions(req, author, content):
            return
        try:
            url  =  'http://%s.%scomment-check'  %  (self.api_key, 
self.api_url)
            self.log.debug('Checking content with Akismet service at %s', 
url)
            resp = self._post(url, req, author, content, ip)
            if resp.strip().lower() != 'false':
                self.log.debug('Akismet says content is spam')
                return -abs(self.karma_points), 'Akismet says content is 
spam'
        except urllib2.URLError, e:
            self.log.warn('Akismet request failed (%s)', e)
    def train(self, req, author, content, ip, spam=True):
        if not self._check_preconditions(req, author, content):
            return
        try:
            which = spam and 'spam' or 'ham'
            url = 'http://%s.%ssubmit-%s' % (self.api_key, self.api_url, 
which)
            self.log.debug('Submitting %s to Akismet service at %s', 
which, url)
            self._post(url, req, author, content, ip)
        except urllib2.URLError, e:
            self.log.warn('Akismet request failed (%s)', e)
    # Internal methods
    def _check_preconditions(self, req, author, content):
        if self.karma_points == 0:
            return False
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        if not self.api_key:
            self.log.warning('Akismet API key is missing')
            return False
        if is_binary(content):
            self.log.warning('Content is binary, Akismet content check 
skipped')
            return False
        try:
            if not self.verify_key(req):
                self.log.warning('Akismet API key is invalid')
                return False
            return True
        except urllib2.URLError, e:
            self.log.warn('Akismet request failed (%s)', e)
    def verify_key(self, req, api_url=None, api_key=None):
        if api_url is None:
            api_url = self.api_url
        if api_key is None:
            api_key = self.api_key
        if api_key != self.verified_key:
            self.log.debug('Verifying Akismet API key')
            params = {'blog': req.base_url, 'key': api_key}
            req = urllib2.Request('http://%sverify-key' % api_url,
                                  urlencode(params),
                                  {'User-Agent' : self.user_agent})
            resp = urllib2.urlopen(req).read()
            if resp.strip().lower() == 'valid':
                self.log.debug('Akismet API key is valid')
                self.verified = True
                self.verified_key = api_key
        return self.verified_key is not None
    def _post(self, url, req, author, content, ip):
        # Split up author into name and email, if possible
        author = author.encode('utf-8')
        author_name, author_email = parseaddr(author)
        if not author_name and not author_email:
            author_name = author
        elif not author_name and author_email.find("@") < 1:
            author_name = author
            author_email = None
        params = {'blog': req.base_url, 'user_ip': ip,
                  'user_agent': req.get_header('User-Agent'),
                  'referrer': req.get_header('Referer') or 'unknown',
                  'comment_author': author_name,
                  'comment_type': 'trac',
                  'comment_content': content.encode('utf-8')}
        if author_email:
            params['comment_author_email'] = author_email
        for k, v in req.environ.items():
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            if k.startswith('HTTP_') and not k in self.noheaders:
                params[k] = v
        urlreq = urllib2.Request(url, urlencode(params),
                              {'User-Agent' : self.user_agent})
        #self.log.warn('AkismetPOST2 %s URL %s', urlencode(params), url)
        resp = urllib2.urlopen(urlreq)
        return resp.read()
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B. Appendix B - Bayes and SVM-light for python
B.1 Example code: Bayes classifier training with python49
###script to train some data Paul Graham style### 
import datetime 
print datetime.datetime.now() 
from nltk.corpus import movie_reviews 
import random 
from nltk import FreqDist 
from operator import itemgetter 
import pickle 
pos_input = open('posTrainData', 'rb') 
neg_input = open('negTrainData','rb') 
#min_sample_size = 50 #for each category 
pos_ids = pickle.load(pos_input) 
neg_ids = pickle.load(neg_input) 
pos_rev_num = len(pos_ids) 
neg_rev_num = len(neg_ids) 
total_rev_num = pos_rev_num + neg_rev_num 
min_sample_size = 200 #change this to suit your purpose 
if (pos_rev_num < min_sample_size) or (neg_rev_num < min_sample_size): 
print "your training sample is not large enough. come back when you have more!" 
else: 
#select training samples 
train_pos_ids = random.sample(pos_ids,min_sample_size) 
train_neg_ids = random.sample(neg_ids,min_sample_size) 
#segregate test set 
#test_pos_ids = [i for i in pos_ids if not(i in train_pos_ids)] 
#test_neg_ids = [i for i in neg_ids if not(i in train_neg_ids)] 
 
#get words from reviews for training 
pos_rev_words = movie_reviews.words(fileids = train_pos_ids) 
neg_rev_words = movie_reviews.words(fileids = train_neg_ids) 
#vocab for both 
vocabulary = list(set(list(pos_rev_words) + list(neg_rev_words))) 
#get word frequency distribution 
pos_fdist = FreqDist(pos_rev_words) 
neg_fdist = FreqDist(neg_rev_words) 
49 This example is  Yunhyong Kim’s own implementation of Paul Graham’s approach to spam classification 
found at  http://www.paulgraham.com/spam.html Because  there  was no spam data easily available the 
movie review corpus from the NLTK toolkit was used, pretending that negative reviews are spam.
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#create probaility table 
hasht={} 
for word in vocabulary: 
pn =0 
nn =0 
if word in pos_fdist.keys(): 
pn = pos_fdist[word] 
if word in neg_fdist.keys(): 
nn = neg_fdist[word] 
if nn + pn >5: 
nquant = min(1,float(nn)/float(min_sample_size)) 
pquant = min(1,float(pn)/float(min_sample_size)) 
prob = max(0.1, min(0.99,float(nquant)/float(pquant+nquant))) 
hasht[word] =prob 
output1 = open('TrainResult', 'wb') 
pickle.dump(hasht, output1) 
output1.close() 
#output2 = open('s250testData', 'wb') 




B.2 Using SVM Light in Python50
B.2.1 A multi-class learner implementation example: 
multiclassify.py
"""A module for SVM^python for multiclass learning.""" 
# The svmlight package lets us use some useful portions of the C 
code. 
import svmlight 
#  These  parameters  are  set  to  their  default  values  so  this 
declaration 
# is technically unnecessary. 
svmpython_parameters = {'index_from_one':True} 
def read_struct_examples(filename, sparm): 
    # This reads example files of the type read by SVM^multiclass. 
    examples = [] 
    sparm.num_features = sparm.num_classes = 0 
    # Open the file and read each example. 
    for line in file(filename): 
        # Get rid of comments. 
        if line.find('#'): line = line[:line.find('#')] 
50 These scripts are from http://tfinley.net/software/svmpython1/ 
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        tokens = line.split() 
        # If the line is empty, who cares? 
        if not tokens: continue 
        # Get the target. 
        target = int(tokens[0]) 
        sparm.num_classes = max(target, sparm.num_classes) 
        # Get the features. 
        tokens = [tuple(t.split(':')) for t in tokens[1:]] 
        features = [(int(k),float(v)) for k,v in tokens] 
        if features: 
            sparm.num_features  =  max(features[-1][0], 
sparm.num_features) 
        # Add the example to the list 
        examples.append((features, target)) 
    # Print out some very useful statistics. 
    print len(examples),'examples read with',sparm.num_features, 
    print 'features and',sparm.num_classes,'classes' 
    return examples 
def loss(y, ybar, sparm): 
    # We use zero-one loss. 
    if y==ybar: return 0 
    return 1 
def init_struct_model(sample, sm, sparm): 
    # In the corresponding C code, the counting of features and 
    # classes was done in the model initialization, not here. 
    sm.size_psi = sparm.num_features * sparm.num_classes 
    print 'size_psi set to',sm.size_psi 
def classify_struct_example(x, sm, sparm): 
    # I am a very bad man.  There is no class 0, of course. 
    return find_most_violated_constraint(x, 0, sm, sparm) 
def find_most_violated_constraint(x, y, sm, sparm): 
    # Get all the wrong classes. 
    classes = [c+1 for c in range(sparm.num_classes) if c+1 is not 
y] 
    # Get the psi vectors for each example in each class. 
    vectors = [(psi(x,c,sm,sparm),c) for c in classes] 
    # Get the predictions for each psi vector. 
    predictions = [(svmlight.classify_example(sm, p),c) for p,c in 
vectors] 
    # Return the class associated with the maximum prediction! 
    return max(predictions)[1] 
def psi(x, y, sm, sparm): 
    # Just increment the feature index to the appropriate stack 
position. 
    return svmlight.create_svector([(f+(y-1)*sparm.num_features,v) 
                                    for f,v in x]) 
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# The default action of printing out all the losses or labels is 
#  irritating  for  the  300  training  examples  and  2200  testing 
examples 
# in the sample task. 
def print_struct_learning_stats(sample, sm, cset, alpha, sparm): 
    predictions = [classify_struct_example(x,sm,sparm) for x,y in 
sample] 
    losses  =  [loss(y,ybar,sparm)  for  (x,y),ybar  in 
zip(sample,predictions)] 
    print 'Average loss:',float(sum(losses))/len(losses) 
def print_struct_testing_stats(sample, sm, sparm, teststats): pass
B.2.2 How to train and test the classifier
Once you've written a Python module in the file multiclassify.py based on svmstruct.py and you 
want to use SVMpython with this module, you would use the following command line commands 
to learn a model and classify with a model respectively.
./svm_python_learn  --m  multiclassify  [options]  <train> 
<model>
./svm_python_classify --m  multiclassify [options] <test> 
<model> <output>
Note that SVMpython accepts the same arguments as SVMstruct plus this extra --m option. If the 
--m option is omitted it is equivalent to including the command line arguments --m svmstruct. Note 
that though we put this command line option first, the --m option may occur anywhere in the option 
list. 
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